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CURRENT DECISIONS
of Civil Procedure requiring a class action to be brought by a member
of the class by saying that because the ATA was found to be a real
party in interest under 17 (a) of the Federal Rules, it was also a proper
party under 23 (a). 4
Consequently, the court, in the case at bar, has sparked a controversy
because, by its own admission, the case "does not fit precisely certain
of the categories in this area where standing has been recognized."
The need to protect fundamental rights seems to be the key concept
behind the court's rationale in the instant case. This decision appears to
be a restatement of the court's power to determine what the representa-
tion criterion shall be. In so doing it affirms the equitable right to shirk
off blind adherence to technical rules when the needs of the public are
at stake and, thereby, helps to preserve and maintain flexibility in the
law.
Robert Wick
Workmen's Compensation-REcovERY FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS UN-
DER FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT. Demko, a prisoner in the Federal
Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, was injured on March 12,
1962 while performing assigned maintenance work. He was awarded
compensation' under the statutory provision for compensation of in-
mates so injured.' Subsequently, the respondent brought this action
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act3 in the
Federal District Court which entered judgment in favor of the re-
spondent. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,4 finding
that here compensation was not an exclusive remedy, thus holding
contra to the view adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second
14. 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE, § 23.04, at 3419 (2d ed. 1964).
1. On his release from prison, Demko was to be awarded $180 per month to continue
so long as his disability continued which was later increased to $245.31 per month.
2. "The Corporation . . . is authorized to employ the fund and any earnings that
may accrue to the corporation as operating capital in performing the duties imposed
by this chapter; in the repair, alteration, erection and maintenance of industrial or other
assignments; in paying under rules and regulation promulgated by the Attorney General,
compensation to inmates employed in any industry, or performing outstanding services
in institutional operations, and compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries
suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with maintenance or
operation of the institution where confined. In no event shall compensation be paid in
a greater amount than that provided in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act." 18
U.S.C. § 4126 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1961).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1946).
4. Demko v. United States, 350 F.2d 698 (3rd Cir. 1965).
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Circuit in a recent decision.2 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
In United States v. Demko,0 the Supreme Court, following the view
adopted by the Second Circuit in Granade v. United States,7 reversed
the lower court's decision. The Court held that the right of recovery
under the statutory provisions to compensate federal prisoners injured
in prison work8 is sufficiently comprehensive to be exclusive and to
preclude recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The opposite view rejected by the Supreme Court was first reached
in United States v. Muniz' ° which viewed 18 U.S.C. § 4126, the compen-
sation statute, as neither a certain nor a uniform scheme for compen-
sating prisoners injured while in the course of prison employment."
Given such an indefinite system, the Court presumed that it was not an
exclusive remedy 2 and, therefore, a prisoner's recovery under the statu-
tory provision for compensation does not preclude recovery under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.' 3
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court found that compensation avail-
able to federal prisoners for industrial injuries'14 has been specially de-
signed to meet the needs of prisoners and has done so adequately for
more than thirty years.' 5 Federal prisoners should not, therefore, con-
stitute an exception to the general rule that where Congress makes
5. Granade v. United States 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1966). The case held that a
prison inmate eligible for compensation under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 was precluded from
suing under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
6. 87 S.Ct. 382 (1966).
7. Supra, note 5.
8. Supra, note 2.
9. Accord, Nobles v. Federal Prison Industries, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1963);
Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
10. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
11. Arguments used include: 1) the amount of reward is at the discretion of the
Attorney General; 2) compensation is not paid until after the inmate's release from
prison; 3) if the inmate fully recovers before his release, he gets nothing; 4) there is
no provision for a personal physician to be present at the physical examination; 5)
compensation may be suspended if the claimant is convicted of another crime or is in-
carcerated in a penal institution. Demko v. United States, supra, note 4, at pp. 700-701.
12. A distinction is made from the exclusive remedy rule reached in Johansen v.
United States, 434 U.S. 427 (1952); and Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959)
in which a comprehensive system of compensation was available to the government
employees.
13. Accord, Gomez v. United States, 243 F.Supp. 145 (D. Colo. 1965).
14. Supra, note 2.
15. More explicit arguments are set forth in Granade v. United States, supra, note 7,
at p. 843. 1) Although the statute does not spell out the full details of the system,
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compensation available to an employee, it is his exclusive remedy and
precludes recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act.1" The Court
distinguished the case at bar from United States v. Muniz' 7 where a
federal prisoner, who had no claim under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 was al-
lowed to bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
By its decision in Demko v. United States,' the Supreme Court brings
the law surrounding workmen's compensation for federal prisoners
into the general rule of law regarding exclusive recovery under work-
men's compensation statutes. In so doing the Court takes notice of the
special status occupied by prisoners'9 and clarifies their remedy for
injuries incurred while working at assigned jobs.
Robert P. Kahi
regulations do, and they make the award mandatory; 2) prisoners injured while per-
forming paid prison jobs do receive full pay while disabled; 3) prisoners injured while
performing jobs for which there is no pay are not awarded compensation benefits until
their release and then only if they have not fully recovered because they have ex-
perienced no loss of earnings, and receive food, clothing, shelter and medical attention.
16. Accord, Richardson v. United States, 336 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1964); Rizzutto v.
United States, 298 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1961); Balancio v. United States, 267 F.2d 135
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 875 (1959); Aubrey v. United States, 103 US.
App. D.C. 65, 254 F.2d 768 (1964).
17. Supra, note 10.
18. Supra, note 6.
19. It is inconceivable that a similar administrative remedy for any other class of
citizens could be considered comprehensive.
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